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I. INTRODUCTION 
17 U.S.C. § 106 states: 
[T]he owner of [a] copyright . . . has the exclusive rights 
to do and to authorize any of the following: . . . (4) in the 
case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly; . . . and (6) in the case of sound recordings, to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a 
digital audio transmission.1 
 
        *  This is an updated and revised version of an article that first appeared in 
the American Bar Association’s Entertainment and Sports Lawyer. Todd Brabec, The 
Performance Right: A World in Transition, 31 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1 (2015).  
        †  Todd Brabec, Esq., former ASCAP Executive Vice President and 
Worldwide Director of Membership, is a Deems Taylor Award-winning co-author 
with Jeff Brabec. See JEFFREY BRABEC & TODD BRABEC, MUSIC, MONEY AND SUCCESS: 
THE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO MAKING MONEY IN THE MUSIC BUSINESS (7th ed. 2011). He is 
also an Adjunct Professor at University of Southern California, where he teaches 
Music Licensing, Music Publishing and Film, Television and Video Game Scoring, 
and Song Contracts; a Governing Committee member of the American Bar 
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These two exclusive rights of copyright are at the heart of the 
worldwide business of music. They involve musical compositions 
and sound recordings, rights of copyright owners and limitations 
on those rights, and how creators and copyright owners are 
compensated. 
II. THE MUSIC BUSINESS PRE-DIGITAL 
In the world of traditional media—primarily radio and 
television—music licensing has evolved into a fairly straightforward 
process. For musical compositions, songwriters, composers, and 
music publishers join or affiliate with the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, 
Inc. (BMI), or SESAC, which are performing rights organizations 
(PROs) who negotiate license agreements for the use of music, 
collect the fees, and distribute them back to writers and publishers 
who have performances in specific media.2 If a PRO and a user 
cannot agree on license fees, courts intervene and determine 
“reasonable fees” for music use.3 
In the area of sound recordings, performances on traditional 
over-the-air radio are exempt from royalties and considered to be 
“promotional” tools to drive sales.4 A record company’s main 
source of income, other than record sales, comes from the 
licensing of master recordings to television series, feature films, and 
advertising commercials, among other uses. And then came the 
digital world—a technological revolution that changed everything. 
This is a rather simplistic view of the music business, but one 
that serves as an appropriate starting point for an increasingly 
complex and changing business. 
III. MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS 
In the United States, there are three primary organizations 
that represent songwriters, composers, and music publishers on a 
non-exclusive basis in the negotiation, collection, and distribution 
 
Association Forum on the Entertainment and Sports Industries; and an 
entertainment industry consultant and attorney. He can be contacted at 
toddbrabec@gmail.com or http://www.musicandmoney.com. 
 1.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). 
 2.  See infra Part III.  
 3.  See infra Part III (discussing Rate Courts). 
 4.  See infra Part VII. 
2
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of music performance license fees. The organizations are the 
ASCAP,5 BMI,6 and SESAC.7 The primary sources of license fees are 
traditional radio, broadcast and cable television, and general 
licensing (e.g., live performance, music in bars and restaurants, 
etc.).8 
New media license fees, which include online and digital 
music services, currently represent a relatively small portion of U.S. 
domestic music license fees (approximately $150 million of a total 
annual domestic PRO collection of $1.5 billion).9 Royalty 
distributions are made—fifty percent to writers and fifty percent to 
music publishers—after operating costs (approximately twelve to 
thirteen percent in the cases of ASCAP and BMI) are taken into 
account.10 There is a PRO in practically every country of the world 
where, via reciprocal agreements with ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, 
U.S. writers’ and publishers’ works are represented and paid for 
when performances occur in foreign territories.11 
ASCAP and BMI entered into Consent Decrees with the 
federal government in 1941, with amendments to those Decrees in 
1950, 1960, and 2001 in the case of ASCAP, and amendments in 
1966 and 1994 in the case of BMI.12 One aspect of these Decrees, 
which has had a significant effect on the determination of license 
 
 5.  4 ALEXANDER LINDEY & MICHAEL LANDAU, LINDEY ON ENTERTAINMENT, 
PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS § 8:52 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2016). 
 6.  Id. § 8:55. 
 7.  Id. § 8:58. 
 8.  See Todd Brabec & Jeff Brabec, Performing Rights Licensing in the United 
States: A World of Multiple Choices, Considerations, and Results, 30 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 
8, 8 (2012). 
 9.  See AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, ASCAP ANNUAL 
REPORT 2014, at 17 (2014), http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf/about 
/annual-reports/ascap_annual_report_2014.pdf [hereinafter ASCAP REPORT]; 
BROAD. MUSIC, INC., BMI ANNUAL REVIEW 2013–2014, at 12 (2014), 
http://www.bmi.com/pdfs/publications/2014/BMI_Annual_Review_2014.pdf 
[hereinafter BMI REVIEW]. SESAC is a private for-profit corporation that does not 
publicly disclose its financial information. Reliable estimates are provided by the 
author. 
 10.  See LINDEY & LANDAU, supra note 5, §§ 8:52, 8:55; ASCAP Payment System, 
ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/royalties.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2016); General Royalty Information, BMI, http://www.bmi.com/creators 
/royalty/general_information (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
 11.  See infra Part III. 
 12.  Michael A. Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing 
Rights in Broadcasting, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349, 349 (2001). 
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fees, is the existence of a separate “Rate Court” for ASCAP and 
BMI, which comes into play when the PRO and a music user 
cannot come to a negotiated agreement as to what “reasonable” 
license fees should be in any given area.13 The Decrees allow any 
party to apply to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York for a determination of interim and final fees.14 These 
Rate Courts have been in existence with ASCAP since 1950 and 
with BMI since 1994, and they have determined fees and license 
terms for the major traditional media areas of radio and broadcast 
and cable television as well as in recent years, the online music 
community.15 It is in these latter “new media” decisions and 
settlements where most of today’s complex issues have arisen.16 
SESAC, the smallest of the PROs, operates on a for-profit basis 
as opposed to the non-profit operations of ASCAP and BMI. SESAC 
is not governed by a Consent Decree with the government and does 
not have a “Rate Court” type procedure for license fee 
adjudications and disputes.17 Under a recent October 2014 
settlement with the Television Music License Committee (TMLC) 
regarding a class action antitrust suit involving local television 
stations though, SESAC has agreed, as part of the settlement, to 
binding arbitration for any future licensing fee disputes with the 
settlement class that cannot be resolved by negotiation.18 It was 
further agreed that SESAC could not interfere with the ability of 
any affiliate to issue a public performance rights license directly to 
a settlement class member.19 In July 2015, SESAC also came to a 
settlement with the Radio Music Licensing Committee (RMLC) to 
end antitrust litigation anticompetitive behavior regarding license 
fees.20 As part of the settlement, SESAC agreed to binding 
arbitration if future negotiated license fee discussions were 
 
 13.  See id. at 356.  
 14.  See id. 
 15.  See id. 
 16.  See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., Nos. 13 Civ. 4037(LLS), 
64 Civ. 3787(LLS), 2013 WL 6697788, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013).  
 17.  Einhorn, supra note 12, at 355. 
 18.  Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, 87 F. Supp. 3d 650, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); 
Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 19.  Meredith Corp., 87 F. Supp. 3d at 657. 
 20.  William Velez, Radio Industry and SESAC Reach Settlement, RADIO MUSIC 
LICENSE COMMITTEE (July 23, 2015), http://www.radiomlc.org/pages/6282116 
.php.  
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unsuccessful, as well as provisions allowing writers and publishers 
more flexibility in granting direct licenses to radio stations.21 
In the online world of music licensing, the ASCAP Rate Court 
has been instrumental in deciding not only what “reasonable” 
license fees should be, but also what is actually licensable by PROs. 
Interim fee and final fee decisions have involved many of the 
biggest players in the “new media/technology” world and have 
resulted in license fees significantly below what PROs and copyright 
owners were requesting.22 To put the online fees into perspective, 
ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC collected approximately $1.5 billion in 
domestic U.S. license fees (e.g., radio, broadcast television, cable 
television, live performance).23 Of this amount, approximately $150 
million was generated from all online/digital uses.24 PROs receive 
an additional $700 million each year from foreign collection 
societies (e.g., PRS, GEMA, SACEM, SIAE, SGAE, SOCAN, APRA, 
IMRO, JASRAC, BUMA) for performances of U.S. writers’ works 
performed in foreign countries, with a small portion of that money 
attributable to online use.25 Most publishers, incidentally, collect 
their foreign country performance royalties directly from those 
societies as direct members or through sub-publishers. 
Commencing with the 2007 AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo case, Rate 
Court filings, hearings, and decisions have involved YouTube, 
MobiTV, AT&T Mobility, Verizon Wireless, Spotify, Ericsson, and 
Netflix, among others. A brief summary of some of the most 
important points of these cases should help in understanding the 
current status of online performance licensing. 26 
The AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo Rate Court case had major 
worldwide significance as there was a summary judgment ruling 
that the downloading of a music file did not constitute a public 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See, e.g., United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers 
(AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo I), 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 23.  See ASCAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 17; BMI REVIEW, supra note 9, at 13. 
SESAC estimates provided by the author. 
 24.  See ASCAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 15; BMI REVIEW, supra note 9, at 3. 
SESAC estimates provided by the author. 
 25.  ASCAP REPORT, supra note 9, at 15, 17; BMI REVIEW, supra note 9, at 12. 
SESAC estimates provided by the author. 
 26.  See Todd Brabec & Jeff Brabec, Online Music Licensing: From PROs, AOL, 
and MobiTV to SoundExchange, AT&T, and the CRB, 29 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1 
(2011). 
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performance under the Copyright Act27—a ruling totally contrary 
to the laws of most other countries, with the exception of Canada.28 
This decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
with certiorari denied by the U.S. Supreme Court.29 The circuit 
court also remanded the fee formula back to the district court for 
further proceedings.30 The 2009 Verizon Wireless Rate Court case 
reaffirmed the “no performance in a download” decision in a 
ruling that stated that the transmission of a ringtone to a cellular 
telephone customer did not constitute a performance and the 
mechanical ringtone rate of twenty-four cents per download was 
the only appropriate right and compensation involved.31 The 
primary issue of the 2009 AT&T case was whether previews of 
ringtones were to be considered “fair use” rather than licensable 
performances.32 The court ruled in favor of ASCAP, and a 
customer’s previewing of ringtones was therefore licensable by 
PROs.33 
A 2009 interim fee decision regarding YouTube is a good 
example of the size of court-set “reasonable” music license fees, 
with an order of $70,000 a month.34 The 2010 MobiTV case involved 
what a reasonable license fee should be for the delivering of 
television programming to mobile telephones and audio 
channels.35 In this case, the court returned to the early 1990s 
ASCAP performance licenses with Turner Broadcasting, which set a 
three-tiered license based on the music intensity of the program.36 
 
 27.  See AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo I, 485 F. Supp. at 441. 
 28.  See David M. Given, A Modern Pandora’s Box Music, the Internet, and the 
Dilemma of Clearing Public Performance Rights, 26 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 19 (2008). 
 29.  See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers 
(AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo II), 627 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The downloaded 
songs are not performed in any perceptible manner during the transfers; the user 
must take some further action to play the songs after they are downloaded.”), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 366 (2011). 
 30.  Id. at 76. 
 31.  In re Cellco P’ship (Verizon Wireless), 663 F. Supp. 2d 363, 374–75 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 32.  United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers (AT&T), 
599 F. Supp. 2d 415, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 33.  See id. at 434. 
 34.  United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers 
(YouTube), 616 F. Supp. 2d 447, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 35.  In re Application of MobiTV, Inc. (MobiTV I), 712 F. Supp. 2d 206, 232 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 36.  Id. at 222. 
6
Mitchell Hamline Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/mhlr/vol42/iss1/7
1 (Do Not Delete) 3/24/2016  7:52 PM 
22 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:16 
The music intensive fee was 0.9% of defined revenue with a 0.375% 
fee for general entertainment and a 0.1375% fee for news and 
sports programming.37 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the lower court’s decision.38 
All of the aforementioned cases were eventually settled with 
additional settlements and agreements entered into with Apple 
Radio, Spotify, Netflix, and Hulu, as well as others. Practically all 
settlements in this area are confidential. 
IV. DMX AND PANDORA 
Two additional Rate Court cases, DMX and Pandora, involved 
not only the determination of reasonable license fees, but also the 
role that direct licensing plays in the PRO licensing picture.39 
Under the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees, the agreements that 
writers and music publishers sign with ASCAP and BMI are non-
exclusive; members and affiliates are allowed to directly license 
their works to a music user and bypass the PRO structures 
entirely.40 
DMX is a leading background and foreground music service 
provider that provides pre-programmed music for business 
establishments via direct broadcast satellites or on premise delivery 
mechanisms.41 DMX hired a company to assist and design a direct 
licensing program with copyright owners which eventually resulted 
in direct licenses representing over 7,000 catalogues, including one 
major music publisher, Sony.42 DMX requested from ASCAP and 
BMI a “through to the audience” blanket license which reflected 
the DMX direct licenses already obtained as well as those to be 
negotiated in the future.43 
In July of 2010, the BMI Rate Court entered a final rate for the 
blanket license, subject to adjustment of DMX’s BMI directly 
 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers v. MobiTV, Inc. (MobiTV 
II), 681 F.3d 76, 88 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 39.  Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers 
(Pandora II), 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 
2015); Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX, Inc. (DMX I), 726 F. Supp. 2d 355, 355 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d, (DMX II) 683 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 40.  Einhorn, supra note 12, at 353. 
 41.  DMX II, 683 F.3d at 37.  
 42.  Id. at 38.  
 43.  Id. at 38–39. 
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licensed performances.44 In a separate decision, the ASCAP Rate 
Court ruled that ASCAP is required to issue to DMX a blanket 
license with “carve outs” for the direct licensing program.45 Both 
decisions were appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
which, in June of 2012, affirmed the district court decisions.46 The 
resulting rates significantly reduced the license fees that DMX was 
paying to ASCAP and BMI. 
Pandora is the leading Internet customized radio service and is 
considered a non-interactive service, as opposed to an on 
demand/interactive service where the user chooses what they want 
to hear.47 Pandora entered into license agreements with both 
ASCAP and BMI in 2005 and terminated those licenses at the end 
of 2010 and 2012 respectively.48 In the case of ASCAP, Pandora 
applied to the court for a “through to the audience” blanket license 
for the period 2011 through 2015.49 In the case of BMI, Pandora 
filed an application for a five-year license commencing January 1, 
2013.50 
Based primarily on the small license fees that were awarded by 
the ASCAP and BMI Rate Court judges, commencing with the 
AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo case in 2007, the major music publishers, 
starting with EMI (later acquired by Sony), notified ASCAP and 
BMI that they were withdrawing their catalogues for online 
licensing purposes.51 The major publishers felt strongly that they 
could negotiate more financially acceptable online value deals than 
the arrangements that had been set by prior Rate Court decisions 
and the subsequent settlements emanating from those decisions.52 
 
 44.  DMX I, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 355–56. 
 45.  In re THP Capstar Acquisition Corp., 756 F. Supp. 2d 516, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010). 
 46.  DMX II, 683 F.3d at 49. 
 47.  Pandora II, 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 327, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 785 F.3d 73 
(2d Cir. 2015). 
 48.  See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 4037(LLS), 
2013 WL 6697788, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013); In re Pandora Media, Inc. 
(Pandora I), No. 12 Civ. 8035(DLC), 2013 WL 5211927, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 
2013), aff’d sub nom. Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 49.  Pandora I, 2013 WL 5211927, at *1. 
 50.  Broad. Music, Inc., 2013 WL 6697788, at *2. 
 51.  Pandora I, 2013 WL 5211927, at *2–3; Broad. Music, Inc., 2013 WL 
6697788, at *3. 
 52.  Pandora I, 2013 WL 5211927, at *3. 
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These online media withdrawals were accomplished by specific 
changes in the rules, regulations, and practices of ASCAP and 
BMI.53 Upon withdrawing their works, a number of the publishers 
entered into direct licensing deals with Pandora,54 in effect creating 
a system whereby Pandora had licenses with ASCAP, BMI, and 
SESAC, as well as short-term negotiated direct performance 
licenses with the major publishers. Discussions were also held 
between ASCAP, BMI, and the major publishers with a view toward 
ASCAP and BMI handling the administration of the online licenses 
negotiated by the publishers. 
In response to a motion for summary judgment in September 
2013, Judge Denise Cote, the ASCAP judge, ruled that a selective 
withdrawal of new media rights by publisher members could not be 
implemented without violating the Consent Decree.55 Judge Cote 
further ruled that the ASCAP repertory subject to that license was 
all works in ASCAP at the time Pandora applied for a license 
(January 1, 2011), not when the final license arrived.56 In short, an 
application for a license is treated as a license in effect, and in this 
case, no works could be removed by any ASCAP member during 
the period of 2011 through 2015. Prior to this decision, interim 
licenses were never considered “licenses in effect” until such time 
as a final Rate Court decision was rendered or an agreement was 
reached. Further, when works are finally removed by any 
publishers, those works have to be removed for all licensing 
purposes, not just for online licensing.57 Any users with license 
agreements still in effect at the time of the withdrawal could 
continue to use the withdrawn works up until their specific license 
agreement expires.58 
In a similar summary judgment hearing in the BMI case, Judge 
Louis Stanton allowed the removal of works which occurred prior 
to January 1, 2013, but ruled that those works could not be licensed 
by BMI to any others after any existing license agreements 
expired.59 If BMI cannot offer those compositions to new media 
 
 53.  Id. at *2. 
 54.  Id. at *3. 
 55.  Id. at *10–11. 
 56.  Id. at *11. 
 57.  Id. at *9. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 4037(LLS), 2013 
WL 6697788, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2013). 
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applicants, their availability does not meet the standards of the BMI 
Decree and they cannot be held in the BMI repertory.60 
To put both judges’ “all in or all out” summary judgment 
decisions into a real world perspective, if one were to remove works 
from the current $150 million PRO annual license fee area of the 
online world, one would be forced, eventually, to remove those 
works from the other $1.35 billion in PRO domestic license fees 
being generated by traditional media (e.g., radio, broadcast 
television, cable television, live). Not to mention the effect that 
such withdrawals would have on the reciprocal “flow through of 
money” agreements between foreign collection societies and U.S. 
PROs. As a point of reference, it is important to note that 
practically all new PRO licensing deals with traditional media 
include streaming, website music uses, mobile apps, digital and 
primary broadcasts, mobile and wireless platforms, webcasts, and 
multi-casts. 
On March 14, 2014, Judge Cote issued her “determination of 
reasonable license fees” in a 136-page decision in the Pandora Rate 
Court case.61 The judge ruled that the appropriate fee for the years 
2011 through 2015 was 1.85% of revenue less certain deductions.62 
ASCAP had requested a rate of 1.85% for 2011 and 2012, 2.5% for 
2013, and 3% for 2014 and 2015.63 Pandora had requested a rate 
between 1.7% (the current traditional radio rate—Pandora had 
acquired a small radio station in an attempt to qualify for this rate) 
and 1.85% (the ASCAP form rate in effect for Pandora since 
2005).64 
Two of the more important issues in the Pandora Rate Court 
proceedings involve: first, the concept of the divisibility of 
copyrights, which allows a publisher or copyright owner to make 
deals with various classes of users for their catalogue, and second, 
the disparity in payments between artists and record companies 
and songwriters and music publishers for the same type of 
performance.65 
As to the latter issue, the AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo 2007 Rate 
Court case provided evidence of more than $30 million paid by 
 
 60.  Id. at *4. 
 61.  In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 62.  Id. at 372. 
 63.  Id. at 320. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
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these services to the major record companies over a two-year 
period, whereas their fees to PROs were, in comparison, very 
small.66 According to Pandora’s Securities and Exchange 
Commission Form 10-K filing, the company expended 
approximately 48% of its total revenue of $920.8 million on 
Content Acquisition costs in 2014.67 As to the 48% figure, 44% 
represented costs for internet transmissions of sound recordings 
(primarily to SoundExchange, as well as some direct license with 
labels), with the remaining 4% paid for the musical composition 
performance right (PROs and music publishers).68 
In July of 2014, ASCAP—with Universal Music Publishing, 
Sony/ATV Music, and EMI Music as intervenors—appealed the two 
district court opinions to the Second Circuit.69 The basis of the 
appeal was that the district court erred in ruling that the Amended 
Final Judgment of 2001 (AFJ 2) prohibited ASCAP from accepting 
partial grants of public performance rights and that the district 
court, in setting a final license fee, ignored recent arm’s length 
relevant benchmark agreements.70 
As to the “partial grants” prohibition, ASCAP’s position was 
that the Consent Decree long ago removed any prohibition on the 
right of members to reserve for themselves the right to grant 
exclusive licensing rights to music users.71 Further, such a 
prohibition is in direct conflict with the exclusive rights provided 
by the copyright law to copyright owners.72 
As to the issue of ignoring benchmark agreements in the 
setting of final reasonable license fees, ASCAP pointed out that the 
Sony/ATV Music, EMI Music, and Universal Music Pandora direct 
license deals were all in excess of the 1.85% court set fee,73 as was 
the 2013 negotiated ASCAP Apple iTunes radio license—all “arms 
 
 66.  See AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo I, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 67.  PANDORA MEDIA, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (Form 10-K) 247 (Jan. 31, 2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1230276/000119312512120024 
/d280023d10k.htm. 
 68.  Id. at 20. 
 69.  Brief of Respondent-Appellant, Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of 
Composers, Authors, & Publishers, No. 14-1158-cv(L) (2d Cir. July 28, 2014), 2014 
WL 3887402. 
 70.  Id. at *2, *5, *29. 
 71.  Id. at *25. 
 72.  Id. at *26. 
 73.  Id. at *19. 
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length willing buyer and willing seller agreements.”74 Further, the 
Second Circuit, in its 2010 AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo decision, 
confirmed that a 2.5% rate was a valid benchmark even though it 
vacated the district court’s across-the-board application of that rate 
to all of Yahoo and RealNetwork’s services.75 Accordingly, the 
current “District Court erred in ignoring [the Second Circuit’s] 
guidance in RealNetworks, which established that a rate of 2.5% 
revenue (or higher) is reasonable for all-audio, music-intensive 
digital music services similar to Pandora’s.”76 
In May 2015, the Second Circuit affirmed the March 2014 
Federal Rate Court decision, which set the rate of the ASCAP 
blanket license at 1.85% of revenue and prevented music 
publishers from partially withdrawing the public performance 
licensing rights from ASCAP.77 
As to the BMI/Pandora Media litigation concerning 
reasonable fees and terms for an adjustable fee blanket license, 
Judge Stanton issued a decision—after a five-week jury trial—on 
May 27, 2015, that the 2.5% of revenue rate and other terms 
offered by BMI to Pandora were reasonable.78 The 2.5% of gross 
revenue is subject to adjustments to accommodate performances of 
works that Pandora licensed directly.79 Further, Pandora may 
deduct up to 15% of commissions paid to third party advertising 
agencies.80 The benchmarks the judge relied upon in determining 
the “reasonable” fee included those between Pandora, Sony EMI, 
and the Universal Music Group, which ranged from 2.25% to 
5.85% of Pandora’s revenue; the direct licenses with EMI and 
BMG; its license with ASCAP; and BMI’s agreement with the 
RMLC.81 The term of the deal is four years and runs from 2013 
through 2016.82 Pandora subsequently appealed the decision to the 
Second Circuit.83 
 
 74.  Id. at *9. 
 75.  Id. at *21. 
 76.  Id. at *27. 
 77.  Pandora Media, Inc. v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, & Publishers 
(Pandora III), 785 F.3d 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 78.  Broad. Music, Inc. v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 4037(LLS), 2015 
WL 3526105, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2015). 
 79.  Id. at *24–25. 
 80.  Id. at *26. 
 81.  Id. at *23–24. 
 82.  Id. at *26. 
 83.  See Broad. Music, Inc., 2015 WL 3526105, at *1, appeal docketed, No. 15-2060 
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V. DIRECT LICENSING 
The ability of a copyright owner to directly license a work to a 
music user and bypass PROs was a major issue in the 
AOL/RealNetworks/Yahoo and BMI/DMX Rate Court decisions, as 
well as the current Pandora litigation.84 Language in both the 
ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees guarantee the right of any 
member or affiliate to directly license their works to a user.85 
SESAC, as it is not under a Consent Decree with the government, 
incorporates the following language in its writer and publisher 
affiliation agreements that insures the right to directly license: 
“Publisher retains the right to issue non-exclusive licenses directly 
to any third person for the public performance in the U.S., its 
territories and possessions, of any work subject to this 
Agreement.”86 
When songwriters, composers, and music publishers join or 
affiliate with ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC, they sign representation 
agreements granting to the PRO the non-exclusive right to license 
the non-dramatic public performances of their works. Though each 
PRO contract and governing documents are different as to terms, 
length of contract, withdrawal of works, resignation or termination 
provisions, dispute resolution procedures, payments schedules, 
distribution rules, and benefits, they all are non-exclusive 
agreements whereby the writer or publisher can license a work 
directly.87 PROs cannot interfere in any way with this right or the 
ability to exercise this right. 
Language as to the ability to direct license as well as the effect 
of a direct license has been standard in many types of industry 
 
(2d Cir. 2015). 
 84.  See Pandora III, 785 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Broad. Music, Inc., 
2015 WL 3526105, at *6–7. 
 85.  See Broad. Music, Inc., 2015 WL 3526105, at *6–7. 
 86.  See generally Todd Brabec & Jeff Brabec, Performing Rights Licensing in the 
United States: A World of Multiple Choices, Considerations, and Results, 30 ENT. & 
SPORTS LAW. 8, 10 (2012) (discussing the standard SESAC writer or publisher 
affiliation agreement). 
 87.  See, e.g., AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, ASCAP 
PUBLISHER AGREEMENTS 1–3 (2015), http://www.ascap.com/~/media/files/pdf 
/join/ascap-publisher-agreement.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); BROAD. MUSIC, 
INC., WRITER APPLICATION 3 (2014), http://www.bmi.com/forms/affiliation/bmi 
_writer_kit.pdf (May 2014). 
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license agreements, including work-for-hire and employee-for-hire 
contracts for many decades. A sample clause might read: 
The performing rights in the composition, to the extent 
permitted by law, shall be assigned to and licensed by the 
applicable [PRO] with said organization authorized to collect and 
receive all monies earned from the public performance of the 
composition and to pay the writers and publishers directly. If to the 
extent it is unlawful for the PRO, or any of its affiliates, to issue 
blanket small performing right licenses or the applicable 
performing rights society does not from time to time, for any 
reason whatsoever maintain a regular system of collecting 
performance fees and/or a third party licensee (i.e., a television 
network, independent television station, digital music service, etc.) 
requires direct licensing of such rights, company and publisher 
shall have the right to directly license their respective shares of the 
public performances rights in the composition to such third 
parties. If the company or publishing designee receives a 
distribution of earned public performance fees from any source 
that does not make a separate distribution directly or indirectly to 
publisher and to composer, then publisher shall be entitled to 
receive its portion of such fees and composer shall be entitled to 
receive the writer’s share of such fees. 
Additional variations of a direct license clause are as follows: 
Licensee desires to obtain from publisher a blanket license for 
all necessary performance, reproduction and distribution rights 
implicated by the delivery of programming embodying publisher’s 
catalogue and publisher is willing to grant such right to license on a 
non-exclusive basis. 
The right to publicly perform and to authorize others to 
perform the composition by means of a media entity not licensed 
by ASCAP, BMI, or SESAC is subject to clearance of the performing 
right either from Licensor or from any other duly authorized 
licensor acting for or on behalf of Licensor subject to good faith 
negotiations in accordance with established industry customs and 
practices. 
An issue in many agreements is what happens to the writer’s 
share when a copyright owner, usually the music publisher, directly 
licenses a work to a user. Clauses range from “payments to be made 
based upon the prevailing PRO rates for the specific use,” 
“compensation to be negotiated in good faith,” “reasonable fee,” 
“fee subject to arbitration,” “a complete buyout with no further 
14
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compensation or continuing royalties,” or “50% of any license fee 
received.” 
A further unresolved issue as to an allowable and effective 
direct license under court or Consent Decree interpretation 
involves the situation where a music user (e.g., traditional 
broadcaster, online music service, etc.) contacts a copyright owner 
directly with the request, versus the situation where the ASCAP or 
BMI copyright owner approaches the user to negotiate a direct 
license. This is a fine distinction, but an important one in current 
litigation and Consent Decree interpretation. 
VI. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTERVENTION 
In part because of the Pandora decisions, a major development 
occurred in June 2014 when the Department of Justice announced 
that it would review both the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees “to 
account for changes in how music is delivered to and experienced 
by listeners . . . .”88 The Department allowed a sixty-day period for 
comments from any interested party (e.g., music publishers, 
songwriters and composers, PROs, online service companies, music 
users of any nature, the general public, etc.).89 
A cross-section of some of the views was illustrative of the issues 
as well as the diametrically opposed positions of many of the 
parties. The comments very much reflected a creators versus users 
scenario. 
On the music user side, the National Association of 
Broadcasters (NAB), the Digital Media Association (DiMA), 
Netflix, Fox News, the RMLC, the National Restaurant Association, 
and the Consumer Electronics Association, among others, 
submitted comments.90 The creator/copyright representative side 
 
 88.  Antitrust Consent Decree Review—ASCAP and BMI 2014, U.S. DEP’T JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/ascap-bmi-decree-review (last updated Dec. 16, 2015). 
 89.  See id. 
 90.  See National Association of Broadcasters, Comment on Antitrust Consent 
Decree Review (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi 
/comments/307974.pdf; Digital Media Association, Comment on Antitrust 
Consent Decree Review, http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments 
/307972.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2016); Netflix, Comments on Antitrust Consent 
Decree Review (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi 
/comments/307908.pdf; Fox News, Comment on Antitrust Consent Decree 
Review (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments 
/307811.pdf; Radio Music License Committee, Comment on Antitrust Consent 
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included comments from the performing right organizations 
ASCAP, BMI, PRS for Music (U.K.), SOCAN (Canada), JASRAC 
(Japan), SIAE (Italy), as well as the Society of Composers and 
Lyricists (SCL—film and television composers), Nashville 
Songwriters Association International (NSAI), the National Music 
Publishers Association (NMPA), and the Screen Actors Guild-
American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (SAG-
AFTRA), among others.91 
ASCAP, in its comments, requested that the Rate Court be 
replaced with a faster and cheaper dispute resolution procedure, 
that ASCAP be allowed to bundle and license multiple rights (the 
current Decree prohibits ASCAP from licensing any right other 
than performance), and allowed partial grants of rights from its 
members.92 The arguments centered on the fact that new media 
 
Decree Review (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi 
/comments/307977.pdf; Letter from David Matthews, Nat’l Restaurant Ass’n, to 
John R. Read, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (July 22, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr 
/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307607.pdf.  
 91.  American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, Comment 
Regarding Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (Aug. 6, 2014), http:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307803.pdf; Broadcast Music, 
Inc., Comments Regarding Review of BMI Consent Decree (Aug. 6, 2014), http:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307859.pdf; Memorandum from 
Performing Right Soc’y, Ltd. on Review of ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees, to 
Chief, Litig. III Section, Antitrust Div. (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr 
/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307652.pdf; E-mail from Gilles Daigle, Soc’y of 
Composers, Authors, & Music Publishers of Can., to Chief, Litig. III Section, 
Antitrust Div. (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi 
/comments/307844.pdf; Letter from Satoshi Watanabe, Japanese Soc’y for Rights 
of Authors, Composers, & Publishers, to Chief, Litig. III, Section Antitrust Division 
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments /307760 
.pdf; E-mail from Societa’ Italiana Delgi Autori ed Editori, to Chief, Litig. III, 
Section Antitrust Division (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases 
/ascapbmi/comments/307727.pdf; Society of Composers and Lyricists, Comment 
on Antitrust Consent Decree Review as Pertaining to ASCAP and BMI (Aug. 6, 
2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307971.pdf; 
Nashville Songwriters Association International, Comment on Review of ASCAP 
and BMI Consent (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi 
/comments/307686.pdf; National Music Publishers’ Association, Comment 
Regarding Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307900.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2016); Screen Actors Guild—American Federation of Television and Radio 
Artists, Comments on Antitrust Consent Decree Review (Aug. 6, 2014), http:// 
www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307818.pdf. 
 92.  See American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, Comments 
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users need multiple rights in their business; that publishers need 
flexibility to manage rights and negotiate contracts terms; and that 
property rights are divisible, assignable, and licensable either in 
whole or in part.93 BMI, which is not prevented from bundling or 
licensing multiple rights, requested that publishers be allowed to 
withdraw digital rights and that a binding arbitration model replace 
the Consent Decree mandate.94 
The SCL were in favor of Consent Decree changes and 
expressed concerns that if the major music publishers withdrew 
completely from ASCAP and BMI, “the transparency of 
accountability currently afforded . . . by the PROs and the collective 
licensing model” would be affected.95 The SCL further asserted that 
in a bundled rights situation, it would be difficult to ascertain the 
value of the performance right in bundled transactions.96 Most 
writers in this field sign “work-for-hire” contracts where the back 
end performance royalties represent a substantial portion of their 
income.97 The 165,000-member organization, SAG-AFTRA, the 
“largest labor union representing working media artists,” 
commented that the “scales have tipped too far in favor of 
licensees’ interests over those of the artists” and that the rate-
setting process set forth by the Consent Decrees is inefficient, 
expensive, and burdensome upon PROs and if not modified will 
significantly devalue writers’ works.98 
Sony/ATV Music supported amending the Consent Decrees to 
allow copyright owners the ability to limit the scope of the rights 
they grant to ASCAP and BMI in their musical compositions and to 
require PROs to accept those grants; supported an expedited 
arbitration process for resolving rate disputes; and recommended 
that the reviews of the Decrees occur periodically to take into 
account new technology changes and conditions.99 Sony/ATV was 
 
Regarding Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees 3, 16 (Aug. 6, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/ascapbmi/comments/307803.pdf. 
 93.  See id. at 16, 19–21. 
 94.  See Broadcast Music, Inc., supra note 91, at 2. 
 95.  See Society of Composers and Lyricists, supra note 91, at 2. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See id. at 1 (describing the uniqueness of American work-for-hire 
contracts).  
 98.  Screen Actors Guild—American Federation of Television and Radio 
Artists, supra note 91, at 3. 
 99.  See Sony/ATV Music Publishing LLC, Comments on ASCAP and BMI 
Consent Decrees, at 1–2 (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases 
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not in favor of allowing PROs to handle rights other than 
performing rights, as it was their position that these markets 
already functioned well and that the introduction of such regulated 
entities into the market for these other rights would be “costly and 
disruptive.”100 
As to the foreign performing right organizations who 
submitted comments, widespread concern centered on the belief 
that the current Consent Decrees were outdated in today’s world 
and that changes were essential if music was to be appropriately 
licensed and compensated.101 Partial grants of rights and the 
bundling of multiple rights are commonplace in the foreign 
marketplace, and dispute resolution procedures are less 
cumbersome than the U.S. Rate Court.102 PRS for Music in the 
U.K., which receives over $100 million a year in U.S. performance 
royalties for its members from ASCAP and BMI, expressed 
concerns over the present Decrees and stated that they would 
consider licensing the British repertory directly in the United States 
rather than through intermediaries if it proved more efficient.103 
DIMA, a trade organization whose members include Apple, 
Amazon, Microsoft, and YouTube, stated that the Decrees have not 
harmed ASCAP or BMI financially in terms of the music industry 
generally, and that PROs must be subject to oversight as their anti-
competitive behavior continues to this day.104 Further, if the Justice 
Department does allow all PROs to bundle rights, as well as allow 
partial withdrawals, then substantial oversight must be put in place 
and songwriters must be allowed to keep their rights with their 
PRO if that’s what they wanted regardless of whether the publisher 
removed the works.105 
The RMLC strongly felt that the Decrees were necessary to 
keep the market power of ASCAP and BMI in check.106 Also, if 
publishers were allowed to withdraw from PROs, they could 
 
/ascapbmi/comments/307983.pdf. 
 100.  Id. at 26. 
 101.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Performing Right Soc’y, Ltd., supra note 91, 
at 2; Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers, supra note 91, at 1; 
Societa’ Italiana Delgi Autori ed Editori, supra note 91, at 1–2.  
 102.  Memorandum from Performing Right Soc’y, Ltd., supra note 91, at 3. 
 103.  Id. at 2. 
 104.  Digital Media Association, supra note 90. 
 105.  Id. at 23.  
 106.  Radio Music License Committee, supra note 90. 
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leverage their outsize market share to extract exorbitant license 
fees from licensees. Both the NAB and TMLC also shared these 
views.107 As to Netflix, their position was that the Decrees were in 
place to constrain PROs’ market power.108 They were against 
allowing partial publisher withdrawals, but if the Department 
allowed them, then conditions would have to be imposed to 
mitigate any adverse consequences.109 Finally, the Rate Court must 
stay in place, though it does need to be streamlined. 
VII. SOUND RECORDINGS 
Prior to 1972, no federal copyright protection existed for 
sound recordings. Congress rectified that situation by extending 
copyright to any recordings that were fixed on or after February 15, 
1972.110 The owners of the copyright, therefore, had the exclusive 
right to reproduce and distribute phonorecords embodying the 
sound recording, including by means of digital transmission, and to 
authorize others to do the same.111 Pre-February 15, 1972, 
recordings remained subject to the protection afforded by state 
laws.112 
As to the performance right aspect of sound recordings, the 
right that was enjoyed by musical compositions was non-existent for 
records. No performance royalty existed in any medium for sound 
recordings.113 That changed in 1995 with the passage of the Digital 
Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act (DPRSRA), which 
provided for a limited right when sound recordings are publicly 
performed “by means of a digital audio transmission.”114 The 1998 
 
 107.  See National Association of Broadcasters, Comment Regarding Antitrust 
Consent Decree Review, *2 (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.nab.org/documents 
/newsRoom/pdfs/080614_DOJ_consent_decree_comments.pdf. 
 108.  Netflix, supra note 90. 
 109.  Id. at 9. 
 110.  See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–140, 85 Stat. 391. But see 
Eric Charles Osterberg, Should Sound Recordings Really Be Treated Differently than 
Other Copyrighted Works? The Illogic of Bridgeport v. Dimension Films, 53 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 619, 631 (2006). 
 111.  Osterberg, supra note 110, at 633–37. 
 112.  See Goldstein v. California¸ 412 U.S. 546, 552 (1973). 
 113.  Joshua D. Levine, Dancing to a New Tune, A Digital One: The Digital 
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 624, 628 
(1996). 
 114.  Digital Performance Rights in Sound Recordings Act, Pub. L. No. 104–
39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). 
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) included webcasting as 
a category of performance applicable to this limited performance 
right.115 This new right applied specifically to satellite radio (e.g. 
Sirius XM), internet radio (e.g. Pandora), and cable television 
music channels (e.g. Music Choice).116 Broadcast radio continued 
to be exempt.117 
It is important to note that the statutory license applies only to 
non-interactive services.118 The right to perform copyrighted sound 
recordings for on-demand services (interactive services) remains 
with the copyright owner (normally the label) and is a negotiated 
agreement between the label and the music user.119 These deals 
have taken many forms, including percentage of gross or net 
revenue formulas, per performance rates, an equity stake in the 
business, or a combination of these and other elements. 
The rates and terms of the sound recording statutory license 
are set by the Copyright Royalty Board (CRB), an administrative 
body created by Congress.120 SoundExchange, a non-profit 
organization, has been designated by the Librarian of Congress and 
the CRB to be the sole entity to collect, administer, and distribute 
the royalties from non-interactive webcasting, digital cable and 
satellite transmissions, and satellite audio services.121 Congress also 
gave SoundExchange the right to negotiate agreements separate 
from those set by the CRB through the Webcaster Settlement Acts 
of 2008 and 2009.122 Services therefore can choose whether to be 
licensed under the CRB rates or the SoundExchange negotiated 
rates. 
There are five major sound recording licensing categories, 
each of which is subject to a separate rate proceeding.123 The 
categories are webcasting, satellite radio, pre-existing music 
 
 115.  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105–304, § 405, 112 Stat. 
2860 (1998). 
 116.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114 (2012). 
 117.  Id. §§ 112(a)(1), 114(d)(1).  
 118.  Id. § 114(d)(2). 
 119.  Id. § 114(d)(3)(C). 
 120.  Id. § 801. 
 121.  SOUNDEXCHANGE, http://www.soundexchange.com (last visited Feb. 8, 
2016). 
 122.  Webcaster Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 110–435, 112 Stat. 4974 (2008); 
Webcaster Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 111–36, 123 Stat. 1926 (2009); see also 17 
U.S.C. § 114(f)(5). 
 123.  See 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)–(3).  
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services, other cable and satellite music providers, and business 
establishments. An example of a rate proceeding involved Sirius 
XM satellite radio; the proceeding concluded in 2012 and set rates 
at 9% of gross revenue for a five-year period beginning in 2013, 
and increasing to 11% in 2017.124 
Webcasting IV—the proceeding regarding future webcasting 
rates—commenced in early 2014 and concluded at the end of 2015 
and set rates for the period 2016 through 2020.125 Recent five-year 
CRB per performance statutory webcasting rates were $0.0019 for 
2011, $0.0021 for 2012 and 2013, and $0.0023 for 2014 and 2015.126 
The Webcaster Settlement Acts of 2008 and 2009 allowed 
SoundExchange to negotiate alternative royalty rates (“Pureplay” 
rates) with certain webcasters.127 For non-subscription services and 
broadcasters streaming their content on the internet, the 
“Pureplay” per performance rate started as $0.00102 for 2011 and 
increased to $0.0013 in 2014 and $0.0014 in 2015.128 The rate 
applicable is the greater of the per performance rate or 25% of 
U.S. gross revenue.129 The “Pureplay” per performance rate for 
subscription services started at $0.0017 in 2011 and increased to 
$0.0023 and $0.0025 for 2014 and 2015, respectively.130 No 
percentage of revenue figures applied to the subscription rate.131 
Under those agreements, Webcasters therefore had a choice to be 
licensed through 2015 either with the CRB rates or the 
SoundExchange “Pureplay” rates. 
As to the current Webcasting IV CRB proceeding, 
SoundExchange’s rate proposal for the 2016–2020 period was a 
“greater of” formula taking into account a per-performance rate 
and a percentage of the service’s revenue.132 Specifically, the per-
 
 124.  In re Determination of Rates and Terms for Preexisting Subscription 
Servs. and Satellite Dig. Audio Radio Servs., No. 2011-1 (C.R.B. Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://www.loc.gov/crb/comments/2012-12/Public_Initial_Determination.pdf. 
 125.  See In re Determination of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral 
Recording and Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Webcasting IV), No. 14-
CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. 2014). 
 126.  37 C.F.R. § 380.3(a)(1) (2014). 
 127.  Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2009, 
74 Fed. Reg. 34,796, 34,796–97 (July 17, 2009).  
 128.  Id. at 34,799. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  See id. 
 132.  Introductory Memorandum to the Written Direct Statement of 
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performance rate for commercial webcasters would commence at 
$0.0025 in 2016, then escalate to $0.0029 in 2020.133 The 
percentage of revenue figure would be 55% of attributable revenue 
from activities in the United States for all five years.134 Non-
commercial webcaster per-performance rates would be the same as 
the commercial rates but would only contain a minimum fee and 
no percentage of revenue calculation.135 Their proposal was based 
on the facts that webcasting is a vibrant and growing industry, that 
it has widespread adoption by consumers, and that direct licensing 
deals between record companies and on demand services 
(interactive streaming) were the most appropriate benchmarks to 
use. A review of these deals confirmed that the record companies 
received a minimum share of 50% to 60% of a service’s revenue 
with allocations based on each record company’s share of total 
streams.136 
Music services, on the other hand, argued in their case that the 
industry is not profitable even considering payments under the 
reduced Webcaster Settlement Act agreements.137 Pandora’s 
proposal for non-subscription services was a per-performance rate 
of $0.0011 in 2016 increasing to $0.00118 in 2020, a subscription 
rate $0.00215 in 2016 increasing to $0.0023 in 2020, and a “greater 
of” figure that is 25% of revenue.138 iHeartMedia and the NAB 
proposed a per-performance rate of $0.0005 for five years with no 
 
SoundExchange, Inc. at 1, Webcasting IV, No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. Oct. 7, 
2014), http://www.loc.gov/crb/rate/14-CRB-0001-WR/statements/SX/1A 
_Introductory_Memorandum.pdf.  
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 2.  
 136.  See id. at 13. 
 137.  See generally Written Direct Testimony of Michael Herring at 2–3, 
Webcasting IV, No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.loc.gov/crb 
/rate/14-CRB-0001WR/statements/Pandora/11_Written_Direct_Testimony_of 
_Michael_Herring_with_Exhibits_PUBLIC_pdf; Testimony of David B. Packman at 
3, Webcasting IV, No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. Oct. 7, 2014), 
http://www.loc.gov/crb/rate/14-CRB-0001WR/statements/iHeartMedia/Vol 
%205_01%20Testimony%20of%20D%20Pakman/2014_10_07_Testimony_of_D 
_Pakman_with_Appendices.pdf. 
 138.  Proposed Rates and Terms of Pandora, Inc. at 1–2, Webcasting IV, No. 14-
CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.loc.gov/crb/rate/14-CRB             
-0001WR/statements/Pandora/2_Pandora_ Proposed_Rates_and_Terms_pdf.pdf.  
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percentage of revenue alternative.139 Any direct licenses entered 
into would be excluded from the calculations.140 
On December 16, 2015, the CRB issued their written 
determination as to the royalty rates and terms applicable to the 
digital performance of sound recordings over the Internet by 
nonexempt, non-interactive transmission services (webcasters).141 
The rate for commercial subscription services in 2016 is 
$0.0022 per performance with commercial nonsubscription services 
at $0.0017 per performance.142 The rates for 2017 through 2020 for 
both types of services shall be adjusted to reflect the increases or 
decreases as measured by the Consumer Price Index applicable to 
that rate year. In addition, the rates for noncommercial webcasters 
are $500 annually for each station or channel for all webcast 
transmissions totaling not more than 159,140 Aggregate Tuning 
Hours (ATH) with a per performance rate of $0.0017 for any 
performances in excess of the ATH figure.143 
The “greater of [percentage] of revenue versus per 
performance rate” (Revenue Share) concept, as set forth in the 
prior Webcaster Settlement Acts, was not included in the 2016-2020 
rate determination.144 CRB decisions are appealable to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit within 
thirty days after publication of the determination in the Federal 
Register.145 
VIII.  SOUNDEXCHANGE DISTRIBUTIONS AND DIRECT LICENSES 
The total of all royalties collected by SoundExchange in 2014 
was $788 million, with the statutory license accounting for $755 
 
 139.  Written Direct Statement of the National Association of Broadcasters 
app. B at 3–4, Webcasting IV, No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. Oct. 7, 2014), 
http://www.loc.gov/crb/rate/14-CRB-0001WR/statements/NAB/NAB_FINAL 
_VOLUME_1_PUBLIC.pdf; Proposed Rates and Terms of iHeartMedia, Inc. at 1, 
Webcasting IV, No. 14-CRB-0001-WR (C.R.B. Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.loc.gov/crb 
/rate/14-CRB-0001WR/statements/iHeartMedia/Vol%201_Introductory 
%20Documents/Vol_1_02_2014_10_07_Rate_and_Terms_Proposal.pdf. 
 140.  See 17 U.S.C. § 114(3) (2014). 
 141.  See Current Developments, COPYRIGHT ROYALTY BOARD (Dec. 16, 2015), 
https://www.loc.gov/crb/. 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See 4 WEST’S FED. ADMIN. PRAC. § 4018, Westlaw (database updated July 
2015). 
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million of that figure.146 The remaining collections represent 
royalties received from non-statutory services, including foreign 
country collective management organizations.147 Total gross 
distributions were $773 million to artists and sound recording 
copyright owners.148 Royalty distributions are allocated 50% to 
sound recording copyright owners (many times the label), 45% to 
featured artists, and 2.5% each to non-featured musicians and non-
featured vocalists via the Intellectual Property Rights Distribution 
Fund, administered by the American Federation of Musicians 
(AFM) and the SAG-AFTRA.149 As to the amount of sound 
recording royalties coming in from foreign countries, it is 
important to note that it is limited based on the reciprocal right 
being administered in each country. As the U.S. sound recording 
performance right is a very limited one (non-interactive streaming 
primarily), it substantially reduces the amount of royalties coming 
into the United States for overseas sound recording performances. 
Finally, in the case of rights owners wishing to directly license 
their works to non-interactive services and not rely on the statutory 
license or SoundExchange separately negotiated deals, 
SoundExchange does offer administration services to both labels as 
well as artists for those works. 
IX. PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS 
As previously mentioned, sound recordings fixed prior to 
February 15, 1972, are not subject to copyright under § 301(c), and 
further, any rights they do have depend solely on whatever rights 
are afforded to sound recording owners under state law.150 
 
 146.  SOUNDEXCHANGE, SOUNDEXCHANGE ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2014 PROVIDED 
PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 370.5(C) 4 (2015), http://www.soundexchange.com/wp   
-content/uploads/2015/03/2014-SoundExchange-Fiscal-Report-_FINAL-REPORT 
_ISSUED_3-31-2015.pdf. 
 147.  Id. at 4 n.2. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2)(A)–(D) (2014). 
 150.  17 U.S.C. § 301(c); see also Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62 
F. Supp. 3d 325, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Recordings ‘fixed’ (recorded) prior to 
February 15, 1972 were not, and still are not, eligible for federal copyright 
protection.”); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 252 
(N.Y. 2005) (“Sound recordings produced after February 15, 1972 can be 
protected from infringement under federal copyright law but Congress did not 
extend statutory protection to recordings created before that date.”).  
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In September 2014, in the U.S. District Court for the Central 
District of California case Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 
the court ruled in a motion for summary judgment that copyright 
ownership of a sound recording under the California statute 
includes the right to publicly perform the recording.151 The court 
further held that Sirius XM’s streaming of the 1960s band The 
Turtles’ pre-1972 recordings without authorization and without 
paying royalties constituted copyright infringement.152 In 
November 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of 
New York ruled in Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc. that 
Sirius had committed copyright infringement and engaged in 
unfair competition by publicly performing sound recordings 
owned by Flo & Eddie.153 These cases and their appeals, as well as 
similar pending cases regarding the same or similar issues, need to 
be watched as they will have a very significant impact on future 
sound recording license fees as well as royalties to labels and 
artists.154 
X. WHERE DO WE NOW STAND? 
Of the two performance areas under discussion—musical 
composition rights and sound recording rights—the sound 
recording seems much clearer than the composition side. The 
sound recording performance right, at least for now, is a very 
limited right (traditional radio, for example, is not included) and 
has a statutory scheme in place with rates set by either the CRB, by 
SoundExchange with users, or by direct negotiations between 
copyright owners and users. Over the past ten years, this has been, 
percentage-wise, by far the biggest growth area for sound recording 
copyright owners. Though the status of pre-1972 sound recordings 
is not yet finalized, all indications are that significant royalties will 
start to flow for this category of works. 
 
 151.  Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Flo & Eddie, 
No. CV 13-5693 PSG (RZx), 2014 WL 4725382, (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Memorandum Decision & Order Denying Defendant’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Flo & Eddie, 62 F. Supp. 3d 325 (No. 13 Civ. 5784(CM)), 2014 
WL 6670201. 
 154.  Flo & Eddie, No. 13 Civ. 5784(CM), 2014 WL 6670201 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 
2014), appeal docketed, No. 15-1164 (2d Cir. 2015); Flo & Eddie, No. CV 13-5693 PSG 
(RZx), 2014 WL 4725382 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2014), appeal docketed, No. 15-80102 
(9th Cir. 2015).  
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The musical composition performance right, on the other 
hand, has more questions and unresolved issues in the licensing 
process than ever before. Not only are there unresolved Rate Court 
cases and issues affecting every aspect of the licensing of music in 
the “new media” world (not to mention the effect on traditional 
media licensing), but also the entrance into the field of new types 
of PRO models (e.g., music publishers, business entities, 
administration services, foreign territory rights management 
organizations, etc.) which could, depending on one’s point of view, 
significantly complicate the existing licensing structure for music 
users, achieve “willing buyer, willing seller” market rates for the 
creative community and their representatives, strengthen the 
arguments for licensing through the traditional PRO model, 
weaken the current traditional PRO structures, increase license fees 
and royalties in some areas with reductions in others, initiate an era 
of PRO selective administration services only, and create new writer 
and music publisher royalty payment formulas, values, 
compensation plans, guarantee arrangements, competitive 
matching payment systems, royalty advance deals, bonus and 
“rewards for success” policies as well as other financial incentive 
plans, among other possibilities and results. 
In addition, the direct licensing of works by copyright owners, 
never a major factor in the past, has taken on new significance in 
not only the online “new media” world of music licensing, but also 
in traditional media music licensing practices. Finally, the 
Department of Justice review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent 
Decrees, in effect since 1941, could have a significant effect on the 
future of music performance licensing, assuming that any changes 
encompass more than just minor modifications. 
The foreign marketplace, responsible for the collection of an 
excess of $1.5 billion in annual U.S. writer and publisher 
performance fees, represents an additional area of concern 
regarding the stability, continuation, and accuracy of “overseas” 
royalty collections and payments. The issues in this area are more 
significant for songwriters and composers than music publishers, as 
many publishers collect their monies directly from foreign societies 
as direct members or via sub-publishers. For successful songwriters, 
film and television composers, and writer estates, foreign 
royalties—for many, easily in excess of 50% of their short-term and 
long-term royalty income—have always flowed through the societies 
through reciprocal agreements. Therefore, any change in those 
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relationships could have a major impact on the ability to license, 
track, audit, collect, and receive foreign country songwriter and 
composer royalties. 
The best advice for the future—in all of your deals, 
negotiations, and contracts—prepare for every contingency and 
possibility,” as they may very well come true. 
Welcome to the “new world of performance licensing.” 
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